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Moral and Legal Accountability for Clinical Ethics Consultants 
 In "Exploring Accountability of Clinical Ethics Consultants Practice and Training 
Implications," Kathryn Weise and Barbara Daly propose a model for the accountability of 
clinical ethics consultants (CEC from now on).  Here I argue this account is insufficient, and 
offer a model for determining the responsibility of CECs. 
 Weise and Daly offer a two-part definition of accountability, where a CEC is accountable 
for her actions if and only if she accepts responsibility for her actions and is willing to disclose 
her responsibility to colleagues.  CECs, Weise and Daly suggest, are unsure about the scope of 
their accountability.  Although consultants do not have the final say in medical decisions, their 
recommendations can play an important role in matters of life and death.  Weise and Daly reject 
the idea that CECs are ultimately responsible for the choices made by the group, or the outcomes 
of the medical procedures they advise on. 
 To be accountable for something is to be, in some relevant sense, responsible for that 
thing.  With their two-part definition of accountability, I think Weise and Daly have confused 
two different kinds of responsibility - moral responsibility, and professional responsibility.  The 
first requirement for accountability, on their model, requires that a CEC accepts responsibility 
for her actions; this account is similar to the compatibilist account of moral responsibility 
discussed in Fischer and Ravizza, according to which an agent is morally responsible if and only 
if she takes responsibility for her actions, where one takes responsibility by coming to see herself 
as an appropriate object for praise or blame. (1998)  The problem with this account of 
responsibility is that an agent can take responsibility for anything, including things that are 
wholly outside of their control.  
 Most philosophers, however, argue that moral responsibility requires control.  (See 
Strawson 2002; Simkulet 2012)  One problem with this commonsense view is that it makes sense 
to say that agents are responsible for the consequences of their actions even though these 
consequences are, ultimately, outside of our control.  (See Zimmerman 1987)  However, in each 
case in which it makes sense to hold an agent morally responsible for the consequences of her 
actions, the consequences are foreseeable outcomes of their free choices.  Thus, we are merely 
derivatively morally responsible for the consequences of our actions, and truly morally 
responsible for our free choices.  What makes our free choices morally praiseworthy or 
blameworthy is the intent, and care, with which we make them.  The right thing is to do what one 
has the best reasons to do and to do it for those reasons. 
 Whether, and to what degree, one is morally responsible is a matter of what choices they 
make, and why.  It is sometimes hard for external parties to judge who is morally responsible, 
and to what degree.  Thus, when judging CECs, we ought to focus exclusively on professional 
responsibility.  If we understand the second part of Weise and Daly's definition of accountability 
as an attempt to define professional responsibility, it comes up lacking.  While transparency 
between consultants is desirable, it is a far cry from responsibility.   Weise and Daly recognize 
that a CEC's primary obligation is to their patient's welfare.  Were a CEC to put any other goal 
ahead of their patient's welfare, they are in clear breach of their professional ethics. 
 It is my goal here to offer a theory on the scope and degree of professional responsibility.  
Because we can only be properly held responsible for our free choices, the scope is clear - a CEC 
is professionally responsible for any free choice they make as a CEC.  The degree of one's 
professional responsibility, I suggest, is equally clear - CECs are very responsible.  CECs 
regularly deal with matters of life and death for their patients, and just medical physician is held 
to a high moral standards, so too should CECs.  The degree of one's professional responsibility is 
determined by the subject matter of one's profession. 
 I will use the following case to illustrate the scope and degree of a CEC's professional 
responsibility.  A clinical ethics consultant ends up with the deciding vote as to who will receive 
a replacement liver between patients A and B.  The candidates are roughly equivalent, each is 
divorced with a young child, each needs a liver because of genetic factors, each donates time and 
money to charity, and each is in a relatively high risk profession - A is a police officer, while B is 
a fire fighter.  Because both patients are similar, it would be understandable - and perhaps 
acceptable - for the consultant to use an arbitrary decision making process to choose between 
them - such as flipping a coin.  Suppose that on her way to find a coin to flip, the consultant 
discovered some feature about patient A that the consultant disapproves of - A's religious beliefs, 
political beliefs, sexual orientation, or hair color - and for this reason votes that patient B should 
receive the organ, not patient A. 
 It strikes me that the consultant's choice in this case would violate their professional 
responsibility.  The problem here isn't the decision that the consultant makes, or the 
consequences of the decision - after all, she might just as easily have chosen patient B by 
flipping a coin; rather the problem is that she makes a life or death decision for irrelevant reasons.  
It is tempting to say that the consultant places her own personal moral values - in this case her 
disapproval of some medically irrelevant facet of patient A's life - above her duty to impartiality 
as a consultant; but this isn't correct.  What makes an action morally good or bad is the reason 
one has to make it, the moral failing here is that the consultant's disapproval is morally suspect.  
Each of us has different moral beliefs, but we also have different reasons for our moral beliefs.  
A clinical ethics consultant might be morally justified in discriminating against a patient because 
of race, sex, religion, sexual orientation, or physical features if they have persuasive reasons to 
do so.  For example, one might have been raised to believe that as people commit violence, their 
hair color turns a darker shade.  Such a CEC might be morally justified in discriminating against 
dark haired people because they erroneously believe them to be vicious.  To make sure that 
CECs don't make decisions based on erroneous beliefs, the medical profession requires 
transparency with regards to the reasons their CECs make decisions.  In the case above, the CEC 
fails in their professional obligation to transparency, and fails to offer a substantive reason why 
patient A is morally inferior to patient B. 
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